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Under the Immigration Act, permanent residents and illegal immigrants may, for a number of reasons, be
deported from Canada for life. Even after residing in this country for many years, immigrants without the
formality of citizenship enjoy only a limited right to remain. The author argues that deportation violates an
immigrant's right to life, liberty and security of the person under section 7 of the Charter. And where that
person has established fundamental connections with Canada, through family relations, education,
employment, culture, etc., deportation, moreover, is not in accordance with the principles of fundamental
justice. In determining the principles of fundamental justice as they apply to the deportation of immigrants,
the common law alone must not be determinative; one must look to a multitude of sources. These would
include other provisions of the Charter, the jurisprudence of free and democratic societies, and customary
and conventional international law. All of these sources, when considered together, point to an enhanced
recognition of a right to remain for long-term residents.
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FUNDAMENTAL (IN)JUSTICE: THE
DEPORTATION OF LONG-TERM
RESIDENTS FROM CANADA
By RUSSELL P. COHEN*
Under the Immigration Act, permanent residents and
illegal immigrants may, for a number of reasons, be
deported from Canada for life. Even after residing in
this country for many years, immigrants without the
formality of citizenship enjoy only a limited right to
remain. The author argues that deportation violates animmigrant's right to life, liberty and security of the
person under section 7 of the Charter. And where that
person has established fundamental connections with
Canada, through family relations, education,
employment, culture, etc., deportation, moreover, is not
in accordance with the principles of fundamental
justice. In determining the principles of fundamental
justice as they apply to the deportation of immigrants,
the common law alone must not be determinative; one
must look to a multitude of sources. These would
include other provisions of the Charter, the
jurisprudence of free and democratic societies, and
customary and conventional international law. All of
these sources, when considered together, point to an
enhanced recognition of a right to remain for long-term
residents.
La Loi sur Pimnigration prcise que les rdsidents
permanents et les immigrs illfgaux peuvent bien etre,
pour plusiers raisons, d6port6s du Canada I perp6tuit6.
Meme aprs avoir pass6 plusieurs ann6es danas ce pays,
les immigr6s n'ayant pas de citoyennet6 officielle ne
jouissent que d'un droit limitE de rester. L'auteur
propose que la d6portation viole les droits d'un
immigr6 I la vie, A la hbert6, et i la s6curit6 de In
personae, garantis I l'article 7 de la Charte. Si un
individu dtablit des liens fondamentaux avec It Canada,
par rapport I in parent6, i l'rducation, I l'emploi, ia
culture, etc., la d6portation nest surtout pas conforme
aux principes de justice fondamentale. En d6terminant
les principes de la justice fondamentale comme ils
s'appliquent A la d6portation des immigrs, la common
law nest pas dterminante; il faut examiner un grand
nombre de sources. Parmi ces sources devraient 6tre
les autres articles de la Charte, la jurisprudence des
soci6t~s hlbres et d~mocratiques, It droit coutumier, et
It droit international. Toutes ces sources, si
conasid6res ensemble, menent I la reconnaissance
pointue d'un droit de rester pour les rsidents de
longue dur6e.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Under section 6(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms,1 only citizens have the "right to enter, remain in and leave
Canada."2 The constitutional recognition of this right to remain ensures
that no legislation may be passed that allows for the exile, banishment,
or deportation of citizens; a result which accords with various
international instruments decrying such expulsion.3 Pursuant to section
1 Part I of the Constitution Ac4 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982,
c.l [hereinafter the Charter]. See also the Citizenshp Act, R1S.C. 1985, c. C-29.
2 Prior to its constitutionalization, a citizen's right to remain was implicitly recognized by the
Immigration Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1-2, which makes no provision for the deportation of citizens.
Section 5(1) of the Act states that "no person, other than a person described in s. 4 [Canadian
citizens and permanent residents who are not described in s. 27(1)], has a right to come into or
remain in Canada."
3 For the relevant provisions of the international instruments see Arts. 12(2) and (4) of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Pights, Can. T.S. 1986 No. 47 [hereinafter the ICCPR]
(The ICCPR was concluded on 16 December 1966 and came into force in Canada on 19 August
1976); Prot. Art. 4 and Arts. 2 and 3 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms (European Convention on Human Rights) 213 U.N.T.S. 222
[hereinafter the European Convention] (The European Convention was concluded on 4 November
1950 and came into force on 3 December 1953); and Art. 13 of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc. A1810 (1948) Art. 13 [hereinafter the UDHR] (The UDHR
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1 of the Charter, this right "is subject only to such reasonable limits
prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and
democratic society." Extradition has been held by the courts to be one
such limit prescribed by law.4
Permanent residents,5 although vested with a limited right to
enter and remain under the Immigration Act, do not enjoy a
constitutional right to remain. They may be removed from Canada for a
breach of any of the conditions imposed under the Act. Furthermore,
deportation is the only order that can be made with respect to
permanent residents who have violated the Act, regardless of how long
they have lived in Canada. 6 Deportation differs from extradition in so
far as its duration is not fixed by the punishment faced abroad; it is a
punishment of unlimited duration.7 Return is only possible with
ministerial permission.8
Other individuals who have lived in Canada for long periods of
time without legal status9 may also be deported. And while it is within
an adjudicator's discretion to mitigate the penalty in those cases by
substituting a departure order,10 only permanent residents can appeal a
was concluded on 10 December 1948).
4 See Re FederalRepublic of Gernany and Rauca (1983), 41 O.R. (2d) 225 (CA). In that case,
extradition for alleged war crimes was upheld as a justifiable limitation to s. 6(1). Extradition has
also been justified as a reasonable limit on other constitutional grounds: see Canada v. Schmidt
[1987] 1 S.C.R. 500, in which an argument of double jeopardy was rejected; Argentina v. Mellino,
[1987] 1 S.C.R. 536, in which an argument of unreasonable delay was rejected; United States v.
Allard, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 564 in which an unreasonable delay argument was again rejected; and KndLr
v. Canada, infra note 7, in which a cruel and unusual punishment argument and a s. 7 argument
were rejected. See also Hogg, infra note 13 at s. 43.1(b).
5 Under s. 2(1), a permanent resident is defined as a person who (a) has been granted landing,
(b) has not become a Canadian citizen, and (c) has not ceased to be a permanent resident.
6 See s. 32(2): "Where an adjudicator decides that a person who is the subject of an inquiry is a
permanent resident described in subsection 27(1), the adjudicator shall ... make a deportation order
against that person" [emphasis added]. The sole exception is that residents who have violated a
condition of their landing may be subject to a departure order only, s. 32(2.1) (which allows for
return to Canada immediately following departure).
7 Of course, as in Kindler v. Canada (Minister of Justice), [1991] 2 S.C.R. 779 [hereinafter
Kindler], where the punishment faced is the death penalty, extradition is indeed of a duration
comparable to that of deportation.
8 Section 55(1) of the Act states that "where a deportation order is made against a person, the
person shall not, after he is removed from or otherwise leaves Canada, come into Canada without
the written consent of the Minister."
9 By doing so, that person has violated the Act and can be reported under s. 27(2).
10 Section 32(6) provides for the deportation of those persons described in s. 27(2); however,
subject to s. 32(7), under most circumstances, including that of visitors who overstay, the adjudicator
may issue a departure order.
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deportation order. Such an appeal would, under section 70(1), be
directed to the Immigration Appeal Division (LTD) on the grounds of
law, fact, or equitable considerations.11
This paper will examine the constitutionality of the deportation
of long-term residents. It will be argued that deportation, under certain
circumstances, violates section 7 of the Charter. Section 7 states:
Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right not to be
deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice.
The application of section 7 is generally agreed to be a two-step
process.12 Step one of the analysis is to determine whether life, liberty
or security of the person have been violated. Step two of the analysis is
to determine whether any such violation is in accordance with the
principles of fundamental justice. While the courts have, thus far,
largely limited themselves to questions of procedural, rather than
substantive, justice, this paper will explore the substantive ramifications
of section 7. Principally, it is argued that for long-term residents who
have become rooted in Canada through their families, communities, and
employment, and have little connection to their countries of nationality,
deportation is a violation of liberty and security of the person.
Moreover, these violations are not in accordance with the principles of
fundamental justice.
As arguments that deportation violates sections 12 and 15 of the
Charter have been considered elsewhere, I will not raise them again here.
Nor will I examine section 1 of the Charter as all of the factors that
would be considered in a section 1 analysis ought also to be considered
in a section 7 argument. That is, the identification of the principles of
fundamental justice within a particular context and the balancing of
individual and state interests, as required under section 7, render much
of a section 1 analysis superfluous for the purposes of this paper. It
should be noted, however, that the courts have regularly proceeded to a
11 Under particular circumstances involving national security, suspected organized criminal
activity, or the deportation of persons responsible for state-sponsored terrorism or human-rights
abuses, there shall be no appeal on equitable grounds (s. 70(4)). The consitutionality of the security
certificate and of the limited right of appeal was considered in Chiarelli, infra note 15. Immigration
Minister Sergio Marchi has recently announced proposed ammendments to the Act which would
also deny a right of appeal on equitable grounds to those persons convicted of serious criminal
offences.
12 See Evans, infra note 51 at 53-55.
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section 1 justification in section 7 cases, often retracing many of the
steps taken in the earlier analysis13
Immigration law is undergoing significant change. The reasons
for this are many and include, among other things, the significant role of
immigration for Canada; an increasing acknowledgement by the courts
of the profound individual interests engaged by the immigration process;
the economic and social globalization, which has resulted from new
information technologies and the movement of persons; and, perhaps
most importantly, significant shifts in the broader areas of administrative
and constitutional law in Canada. This trend must be contrasted with
the persuasive and persistent grip of state sovereignty which underlies
and continues to influence immigration decisions to a significant degree.
Immigration law is thus at a cross-roads: after its early Charter victory in
Singh v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration),14 which
granted a right to an oral hearing for refugee claimants, the decision of
the Supreme Court of Canada in Chiarelli v. Canada (Minister of
Employment and Immigration)15 signals an unfortunate set back.16
In Chiarelli, a case that considered, inter alia, the constitutionality
of the deportation of a long-term resident, the Court failed to recognize
the constitutional significance of such state action on the individual.
First, the Court inadequately assessed the individual interests that are
affected by the deportation of a long-term resident. Second, in looking
only to the common law and principles of sovereignty, the Court failed
to consider the multiple and varied sources of the principles of
fundamental justice. Finally, in determining whether deportation
accorded with those narrowly-defined principles, it failed to balance
effectively the individual's interests against those of the state. The
Court, in relying upon sovereignty as the ultimate source of authority
over aliens, effectively foreclosed any countervailing argument drawing
upon the significance of long-term community life. However, Chiarelli
13 As Peter Hogg asks, "Could a law that violated the principles of fundamental justice still be
upheld under s. 1 as a reasonable limit prescribed by law that could be demonstrably justified in a
free and democratic society?" After citing the obiter views of both Lamer L (as he then was),
suggesting that a law could be justified, and of Wilson J., suggesting that it could never be justified,
Hogg concludes that "the Supreme Court of Canada has routinely applied s. I before holding that a
breach of a. 7 invalidated a law. The s. 1 justification has been upheld in minority opinions, but
never by a majority of the Court": P.w. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 3d ed. (Toronto:
Carswell, 1992) at s. 35.14(b).
14 [1985] 1 S.C.R. 177 [hereinafter Singh].
15 [1992] 1 S.C.R. 711 [hereinafter Chiarelli].
16 This may be seen as part of a wider movement in later decisions of the Court, with the
departure of the civil libertarian leadership of Dickson CJ. and Wilson L
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also concerned the issuance of a security certificate and the resultant
attenuated right of appeal and perhaps it can be distinguished in future
cases on those grounds.
As I shall argue below, the Supreme Court should take a new
look at the constitutionality of the deportation of long-term residents.
In doing so, it is incumbent on the Court to engage'in a meaningful
balancing of the individual's interests-not to be severed from family,
community, and employment-against the state's interest in order and
safety. Only in this way may the Court ever hope to justify the harsh and
differential treatment afforded to immigrants when compared with
nationals convicted of similar criminal acts.
In this paper, I shall first examine the traditional sources and the
role of the deportation power. This will include an examination of the
relevant case law, and the slow change gradually taking hold at the
Federal Court. In the latter part of this paper I shall discuss the
direction that this transformation should take. I shall outline a
reconsideration of deportation under the Charter, concluding that under
certain circumstances, particularly in the case of long-term residents,
deportation is not in accordance with the principles of fundamental
justice. Throughout this paper I refer to long-term residents. I am
referring primarily to permanent residents; however, long-term illegals
are also subject to deportation-regardless of how well established in
Canada-and raise many similar concerns. In fact, since illegals do not
have the benefit of an appeal before an independent tribunal, their
plight is worse than that of permanent residents. Admittedly, there are
many unique problems faced by illegal residents that would justify
separate consideration; however, this paper is not the forum for that
discussion. The distinction made between citizen and permanent
resident for the purpose of constitutional recognition is a dubious and
formalistic one. Similarly, procedural differences in the treatment of
permanent residents and long-term illegals under the Immigration Act
should also be treated as suspect.
The seriousness of the impact of deportation on a deportee and
his or her family must be recognized. And immigration law, in both
procedure and substance, must accord with those principles that are
enshrined in our constitution. The Supreme Court should abandon
principles drawn from what Peter Schuck labels "classical immigration
law"-"the realm in which government authority is at the zenith and
individual entitlement is at the nadir"17 - and recognize fully, as does
17p. Schuck, "The Transformation of Immigration Law" (1984) 84 Col. L. Rev. 1 at 1.
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Schuck, that "[i]mmigration is gradually rejoining the mainstream of our
public law."18
II. DEPORTATION UNDER THE IMMIGRATION ACT
A. Who is Deported and How?
Under the Immigration Act, a permanent resident may be
removed if they fall under one of four general categories:19
a) Those persons who pose a danger to the Canadian public because of their criminal
activity.
b) Those persons who engage in unacceptable political activity or are considered a threat
to national security.
c) Those persons who pose a danger to Canadian social services.
d) Those persons who have failed to comply with requirements of the Immigration Act.20
If it is believed that a permanent resident falls under one of the above
categories, "[a]n immigration officer or a peace officer shall forward a
written report to the Deputy Minister setting out the details of any
information 21 indicating that a permanent resident is described under
one of the heads of section 27(1). Those heads generally correspond to
the list set out above. Pursuant to section 27(3), the Deputy Minister
then determines whether a report will be forwarded to an inquiry.
If an inquiry is commenced, a member of the Adjudication
Division of the Immigration and Refugee Board will determine, first, if
the permanent resident is a "person described" under section 27(1). If it
is found that the permanent resident falls under any of the paragraphs of
section 27(1), then, pursuant to section 32(2), "the adjudicator shall,
subject to subsections (2.1) and 32.1(2), make a deportation order
against that person" [emphasis added]. The only exception is with
respect to permanent residents who have breached a condition of their
landing; they may be subject only to a departure order. Other persons
who have violated the Act, but who are not permanent residents, face a
similar proceeding before an adjudicator.
18 IbiL at 90.
19 See, generally, s. 27(1).
2 0 L Waldman, Immigration Law and Practice (Toronto: Butterworths, 1992) (looseleaf) at §
6.19.
21 s.27(1).
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Only permanent residents who are ordered deported are entitled
to an appeal before the LAD on factual, legal, and equitable grounds.22
With respect to equitable grounds, the LAD has a very broad discretion,
taking into account "all the circumstances of the case."23 Accordingly,
the LAD will consider a broad range of factors, which are usefully set out
in the decision of the former Immigration Appeal Board in Ribic v.
Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration).24
These circumstances include the seriousness of the offence or offences leading to the
deportation and the possibility of rehabilitation or in the alternative, the circumstances
surrounding the failure to meet the conditions of admission which led to the deportation
order. The Board looks to the length of time spent in Canada and the degree to which
the appellant is established; family in Canada and the dislocation to that family that
deportation of the appellant would cause; the support available for the appellant not only
within the family but also within the community and the degree of hardship that would be
caused to the appellant by his return to his country of nationality. While the general
areas of review are similar in each case the facts are rarely, if ever, identical.25
The factors to be considered by the LAD are comprehensive; however,
their decisions are largely discretionary. As such, reviewing courts have
repeatedly stated that they will not scrutinize too closely the exercise of
the LAD's equitable jurisdiction. 26 I will return to the Ribic criteria,
below.2 7
Given the vast scope of the immigration programme in Canada,
it is difficult to determine precisely how many residents are deported
each year. According to the Ministry of Citizenship and Immigration,
22 Section 70(1). Pursuant to s. 70(4), however, where a deportation order is made against a
person with respect to whom a security certificate referred to in ss. 40(1) or 40.1(1) has been issued,
or a person who has been determined to be a member of an inadmissible class described in ss.
19(1)(c.2) (d), (e), (f), (g), (J) (k), or (1), an appeal may only be brought on a question of law, or fact,
or mixed law and fact. See, for example, Chiarelli, supra note 15.
23 Section 70(1)(b).
24 (1985), (IA.B. T4-9623) [hereinafter Ribic].
2 5 bi&4
26 See Boulis v. Canada (Minister of Manpower and Immigration) (1972), [1974] S.C.R. 875 at
885, where Laskin J. (as he then was) stated that the Board's "reasons are not to be read
microscopically, it is enough if they show a grasp of the issues that are raised by s. 15(1)(b) and of
the evidence addressed to them, without detailed reference." He was referring to s. 15(1)(b), the
former source of the Board's equitable jurisdiction under the Immigration Appeal BoardAct, R.S.C.
1970, c. 1-3.
Whether the courts should be interfering with the decisions reached by a specialized tribunal
raises many difficult policy issues. This rich debate, however, will not be considered here.
2 7 See Part IV, below.
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approximately 4,500 removal orders issue each year3 8 These would
include deportation orders, as well as exclusion and departure orders
issued against residents, refugees, visitors, and those in Canada without
status. Annual reports of the Immigration and Refugee Board (Im) give
a better sense of the number of deportations, specifically, occurring each
year.29 In 1992, for example, the iAD heard 335 appeals of removal
orders issued by adjudicators. Of those cases appealed, 140 were
dismissed and 52 were abandoned or discontinued. Thus, up to 192
permanent residents could have been deported in that year.30 (Though a
permanent resident has an appeal by right, it is presumed that not all
deportees pursue an appeal.) The numbers, considering the size of the
immigration scheme, are not great. However, any number of those
persons deported might be forced to sever family, community,
employment, and other significant ties to Canada and to Canadian
citizens.
B. Sovereignty: The Source and Role of the Deportation Power
Historically, deportation has been used against those persons
deemed unfit to live within a country. The long-standing persuasiveness
and unquestioned authority of this position was illustrated by the
Supreme Court of Canada in Knder, where La Forest J. stated:
The government has the right and duty to keep out and to expel aliens from this country
if it considers it advisable to do so. This right, of course, exists independently of
extradition. If an alien known to have a serious criminal record attempted to enter into
Canada, he could be refused admission. And by the same token, he could be deported
once he entered Canada. This basic state power was described by Lord Atkinson in
Canada (AG.) v. Cain, [1906] A.C. 542 (P.C.) at p. 546:
2 8 Conversation with Kevin Sack, Ministry of Citizenship and Immigration, Public Affairs (6
April 1994). The total number of annual removals are as follows: 1991-92-3,423; 1992-93--4,682;
1993-94 (to April 1994)-4,401; 1994-95 (projected)-5,100.
29 Immigration and Refugee Board, Annual Report 1992 (Ottawa: nm, 1992) at 24. For 1989-
91, see the Annual Report for 1989-91 (Ottawa: nw, 1989-1991). The numbers for previous years
are as follows: 1991-116 dismissed, abandoned, or discontinued; 1990-100 dismissed, abandoned,
or discontinued; 1989-120 dismissed, abandoned, or discontinued. Note that these numbers would
also include appeals, pursuant to s. 70(2), by convention refugees, persons with valid immigrant
visas seeking landing, and persons with valid visitors' visas seeking entry.
30 The issuance of a deportation order does not necessarily mean that the order will be
executed. There are certain countries to which the Minister will not return deportees unless there is
evidence of criminality or concerns regarding national security.
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One of the rights possessed by the supreme power in every State is the right to
refuse to permit an alien to enter that State ... and to expel or deport from the
State, at pleasure, even a friendly alien....
If it were otherwise, Canada could become a haven for criminals and others whom we
legitimately do not wish to have among us.3 1
This statement was adopted by Sopinka J., writing for the Court in
Chiarelli. He added that "[t]he most fundamental principle of
immigration law is that non-citizens do not have an unqualified right to
enter or remain in the country. At common law an alien has no right to
enter or remain in the country."32 This' all-powerful notion of
sovereignty that took hold in the nineteenth century has held an iron
grip on immigration; its dubious sources have, for the most part, gone
unquestioned.
James Nafziger thoughtfully revisits this issue and concludes that
"[t]he proposition that states have an absolute right to deny territorial
access to all aliens has unusual resilience and resonance, but little
historical or jurisprudential foundation."33 While I do not intend to
engage in a critique of the questionable origins of a state's right to
exclude and remove, suffice to say that it is rooted in imprecise legal
doctrine, fears of threatened state security, and, in some cases, overt
racism 34 Immigration control also served as a means of managing the
labour supply and maximizing profit. As Barbara Roberts writes in her
study of deportation from Canada, deportation "maintained a balance
between the need for cheap labour in times of economic expansion, and
the desire to cut welfare costs in times of economic contraction." It also
served to control political dissent when it was exercised by the state upon
those who "upset or threatened the system."35
As I shall argue, for deportation to pass constitutional muster it
must be in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice.
31 inmdler, supra note 7 at 202-03.
32 Chare!, supra note 15 at 733.
33 
"The General Admission of Aliens Under International Law" (1983) 77 Am. J. Int'l L 804
at 841.
34 See, for example, the early American cases interpreting the overtly racist "Chinese
Exclusion Law." In Chae Chan Ping v. United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581
(1889), exclusion was held to be acceptable if it protected the United States from any threat. The
threat in this case involved "an Oriental invasion" (595), "vast hordes," and "the presence of
foreigners of a different race in this country, who will not assimilate with us" (606).
3 5 Whence They Came: Deponadon from Canada 1900-1935 (Ottawa: University of Ottawa
Press, 1988) at 8-9. Roberts also explores the role of deportation in controlling political dissent
through the removal of Communists, and others.
[VOL 32 No. 3
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However, one such principle, sovereignty, has too often led to
fundamentally unjust results in immigration cases. In light of this
troubling history, sovereignty must be critically re-examined.
Sovereignty, and its interpretation at common law,3 6 ought only to be
understood as one of the principles of fundamental justice among a wide
variety of sources that ought to be considered.
C. Administrative Sanction not Punishment
The state's prerogative power to exclude and remove aliens, as
exercised by the executive, has largely been immune from vigorous
judicial scrutiny. Recognized by the courts as a mere administrative
sanction, intuitively, it seems difficult not to see deportation as a
punishment of the highest order. The effect of this suspect classification
of deportation is profound: it maintains and enforces the proposition
that immigration is an administrative state benefit and that, therefore,
immigrants possess no rights. While the language of
administrative/judicial and benefit/right may seem antiquated in the
post-Nicholson3 7 era, it still lingers with great resilience in immigration
law. In Hurd v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration),3 8 for
example, the Federal Court of Appeal in discussing deportation stated
that "[i]t may, in particular circumstances, amount to a grave, personal
disadvantage, but not to the kind of larger-than-merely-personal
disadvantage. ... Deportation is analogous, rather, to a loss of a
licence." 39
The characterization of deportation as analogous to the loss of a
licence fails to capture the significance of the Nicholson holding: the
Federal Court does not consider the seriousness of the impact on the
deportee in more than a cursory way. Moreover, in Singh Justice Wilson
explicitly rejected the distinction between rights and privileges for the
purpose of a Charter analysis.40 Deportation cannot be equated with
36 For a discussion of Blackstone's commentary on the status of aliens at common law see
Canepa, infra note 65 at 275-76.
3 7 Nwholson v. Haldimand-Norfolk Reg. Board of Police Commrs., [1979] 1 S.C.R. 311
[hereinafterNiholson]. Citing Bates v. Lord Hailsham, [19721 WL.R. 1373, Laskin CJ.C. quoted
Megarry J., at 324: "in the sphere of the so-called quasi-judicial the rules of natural justice run, and
... in the administrative or executive field there is a general duty of fairness."
38 (1989), 90 N.R. 31 [hereinafter Hurd].
3 9 Ibi at 38.
40 For a more detailed discussion of this point, see text accompanying note 79.
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losing a job, a licence, or government benefit; it does, however,
encompass all of those interests, with a concomitant loss of family,
community, and, in a word, liberty.
In practical terms, deportation lies much closer to traditional
notions of punishment than to administrative sanction. It is a
punishment, though directed at immigrants, that often results in
significant hardship and suffering for family members and friends, who
may in fact be citizens. In a study of deportation and the immigration
power in Australia, David Wood writes that, in some cases, losing the
right to live in what has become one's homeland can be a deprivation
even more serious than imprisonment. But despite the severity of its
impact, deportation is generally overlooked as a serious form of
punishment.4 ' The reason for the courts' persistent characterization of
deportation as less than serious stems from a number of sources. It is in
part rooted in the reluctance of the judiciary to scrutinize executive
decisions intimately related to state sovereignty or security. Secondly,
deportation has been effectively removed from the realm of criminal
punishment where considerably more common law and constitutional
protections are engaged. Finally, deportation is often justified on the
basis of cost and administrative expediency.
The courts' focus upon classification-visitor, immigrant,
citizen-while ignoring the substance of a person's relationship with the
country, perpetuates the notion that for certain persons deportation is
acceptable treatment. It also lifts from the courts the burden of having
to examine precisely what is at issue in deportation cases, and what
effects deportation has on individuals. As Schuck writes:
In view of what is inevitably and personally at stake, then, it is undeniable that
deportation punishes the alien and punishes her severely. To maintain, as classical
immigration law consistently has done, that deportation resembles a sanction like being
ejected from a national park rather than that of being banished or sentenced to jail,
suggests that something deeply symbolic, not dryly logical, has been at work in the
shaping of the doctrine.... The government's obligations to the alien are viewed as resting
upon her formal status rather than upon her actual relationship to the society.42
It must be acknowledged that the Federal Court is slowly moving
away from its view of deportation as a mere civil sanction. The Charter is
to a large degree responsible for this change. However, as cases as
recent as Hurd suggest, there is still a significant distance to travel until
the courts scrutinize deportation with the same exactitude with which
41 D. Wood, "Deportation, the Immigration Power, and Absorption into the Australian
Community" (1986) 16 F. L Rev. 288 at 288.
42 Supra note 17 at 27.
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they have begun to view other interests. 43 While it is clear that the duty
of fairness applies to immigration proceedings, the recognition of
deportation as giving rise to constitutional rights has been slow in
coming. This, I would suggest, is in part a residual effect of
administrative law's slow embrace of interests beyond those that were
recognized at common law. Immigration law, as a consequence of many
factors, but, in particular, of a powerful notion of sovereignty, only
gradually has moved into a realm where greater legal protections are
being afforded. Similarly, constitutional interests have just begun to be
recognized. This is in part the result of a similar approach taken to legal
analysis under administrative law and section 7 of the Charter. The two
stage structure of section 7 parallels, in many ways, the approach taken
by administrative law to determine, first, whether the duty of fairness
applies, and second, what is required by that duty. Under the Charter,
the threshold requirement of engaging a right to life, liberty and security
of the person must first be met; and, second, the content-encompassing
both procedure and substance-of the principles of fundamental justice
must be determined. The often understated significance that
deportation was given under administrative law continues, in part, to
inform its judicial treatment under section 7. The slow maturation ofinmigration as a branch of administrative law continues to limit its
growth under the Charter.
D. Deportation Under the Charter: Case Law
There has been a considerable number of cases that have
considered deportation under the Charter, focussing on sections 7, 12,
and 15 in particular. The purpose of this discussion, however, will be to
assess only the development of section 7. Given this focus, it would at
times be unnecessary to distinguish between immigration and refugee
cases. Nevertheless, it is important to realize that immigration and
refugee cases raise distinctly different concerns, in particular with
respect to the threshold question of whether there is a deprivation of
life, liberty and security of the person.
43 See, for example, Knight v. Indian Head School Division No. 19, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 653, where
L'Heureux-Dub6 J., at 669, held that dismissal from a public office would engage the duty of
fairness. "The existence of a general duty to act fairly will depend on the consideration of three
factors: (i) the nature of the decision to be made by the administrative body, (ii) the relationship
existing between that body and the individual; and (iii) the effect of that decision on the individual's
rights.-
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The following discussion of the case law is centred around the
Supreme Court of Canada's decision in Chiarelli. Following an
assessment of Chiarelli, I will canvas the earlier case law ifi order to
provide the larger backdrop against which it must be viewed.
Subsequent case law will then be examined in order to assess the impact
of this decision.
In Chiarelli,44 the Supreme Court of Canada considered a
number of issues respecting the deportation of a long-term resident
convicted of serious criminal offences, and to whom a security certificate
had been issued. Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Sopinka held
that deportation for the commission of a serious criminal offence does
not violate the Charter.
The first question answered by the Court was whether there had
been a deprivation of liberty or security of the person. Referring only to
the Federal Court judgment in Hoang v. Canada (Minister of
Employment and Immigration),45 where it was held that deportation was
not to be conceptualized as a deprivation of liberty, Sopinka J. stated
that it was unnecessary to answer this question ,as there was no breach of
fundamental justice. I would argue that the matter was squarely before
the Court and it ought to have been answered. Moreover, in order to
properly contextualize the principles of fundamental justice, it is critical
to the analysis that the Court accurately identify the interests at stake.
Mr. Chiarelli's relationship with his family, his community, and the
country to which he would have been returned were all factors that
ought to have been considered when characterizing the deprivation
resulting from deportation. Without understanding precisely what is at
issue for a deportee and balancing his or her interests against those of
the state-a necessary step when determining if state action accords with
the principles of fundamental justice-the Court is left to make blind
assessments, and not the highly contextualized determinations called for
by Justice Lamer, as he then was, in Re B.C. Motor Vehicle Act.46
In determining the principles of fundamental justice as they
apply to this case, Sopinka J. stated that
the court must look to the principles and policies underlying immigration law. The most
fundamental principle of immigration law is that non-citizens do not have an unqualified
4 4 Chiard supra note 15.
45 (1990), 13 Imm. L R. (2d) 35 [hereinafter Hoang].
46 [1985] 2 S.C.R. 486 [hereinafter B.C. Motor Vehicles]. Lamer J. stated, at 513, that the
principles of fundamental justice "cannot be given any exhaustive content or simple enumerative
definition, but will take on concrete meaning as the courts address alleged violations of s. 7."
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right to enter or remain in the country. At common law an alien has no right to enter or
remain in the country.4 7
Sopinka J., moreover, turned to the Charter itself to further justify the
qualification of the rights of permanent residents:
The distinction between citizens and non-citizens is recognized in the Chatier. While
permanent residents are given the right to move to, take up residence in, and pursue the
gaining of a livelihood in any province in s. 6(2), only citizens are accorded the right "to
enter, remain in and leave Canada" in s. 6(1).
Thus Parliament has the right to adopt an immigration policy and to enact legislation
prescribing the conditions under which non-citizens will be permitted to enter and remain
in Canada.48
He then considered the state's interest in removing those who
violate conditions of permanent residency set down in the Immigration
Act:
One of the conditions Parliament has imposed on a permanent resident's right to remain
in Canada is that he or she not be convicted of an offence for which a term of
imprisonment of five years or more may be imposed. This condition represents a
legitimate, non-arbitrary choice by Parliament of a situation in which it is not in the
public interest to allow a non-citizen to remain in the country.4 9
Thus, for Sopinka J., when viewed in the context of immigration
law, deportation for a criminal offence does not violate the Charter. I
suggest that to hold forth the basic tenets of immigration law as the sole
source of fundamental justice in this case is wholly inadequate. Not only
does looking broadly at an entire branch of law de-contextualize the
principles of fundamental justice, it also precludes any consideration of
the individual's interests vis a vis the state. Secondly, "the basic tenets of
our legal system,"50 as one of the varied sources of the principles of
fundamental justice, are certainly broader and can be woven from a
richer fabric than the common law as it applies to aliens. In considering
the sources and content of the principles of fundamental justice, John
Evans writes:
[The courts] should also acknowledge that the common law is not the only source of the
"basic tenets" of our legal system. Sometimes, the growth of the common law may have
been stunted by historical circumstances so that it no longer represents contemporary
47 Chiarelli, supra note 15 at 733.
48 Ibid. at 733-34.
49 Jbid. at 734.
50 B.C. Motor Vehicles, supra note 46 at 503.
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notions of administrative justice, at least when the interests protected by section 7 arc in
jeopardy.51
Finally, in concluding that removing a resident for serious
criminality is "a legitimate and non-arbitrary choice of Parliament,"
Sopinka J. failed to appreciate that, in the case of long-term residents,
the distinction between citizenship and residency is, in fact, highly
arbitrary and formalistic. As is discussed below,5 2 citizenship is no
longer the basis for the distribution of many societal rights. In many
cases it is residency, and the substantive relations that flow from it, that
serve to ground an individual in his or her community and, more
generally, in his or her country.
It must be acknowledged that the Court in Chiarelli also
considered the issuance of a security certificate and its effects upon the
deportation process. While Sopinka J. did expressly consider whether
deportation offends the Charter, it may be that when the Court has an
opportunity to reconsider the issue, this case will be distinguished on the
grounds that the very serious security and criminality allegations
informed the proceeding. Moreover, it is evident from the judgment
that many issues remain open. In particular, the Court must decide
whether deportation engages liberty or security interests, thereby giving
rise to a consideration of the principles of fundamental justice.
To assess the decision in Chiarelli and to determine whether
other courts have subsequently moved beyond the arguably limited
holding in that case, it is useful to turn to the jurisprudence of the
Federal Court. This is particularly helpful in regard to the deportation
of permanent residents and, more generally, with respect to the
application of section 7 of the Charter in Immigration and Refugee
Board adjudication inquiries.
In R. v. Gittens,5 3 the first reported immigration decision to
consider Charter arguments, the Federal Court held that deportation to
Guyana of a person convicted of a number of criminal offences did not
violate the Charter. The applicant had lived in Canada since early
childhood and had no known relatives in Guyana and could not speak
the language. The Court rejected the argument that deportation would
deprive the applicant of the right to life, liberty and security of the
person, as well as other Charter arguments. In doing so, the Court
51 "The Principles of Fundamental Justice: The Constitution and the Common Law" (1991)
29 Osgoode Hall L.J. 51 at 85-86.
52 See Part 1I1.C.2.d), below.
53 (1982), 137 D.L.R. (3d) 687 (F.C.T.D.).
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regarded as "entirely irrelevant the effect deportation may have on other
members of his family."54  Fortunately, the Court's position in
Gittens-that deportation does not engage section 7 rights-is likely no
longer correct, as Waldman suggests, 55 in light of more recent
pronouncements from the Court.
In 1985 the Supreme Court stated unequivocally in Singh56 that a
refugee is entitled to an oral hearing. More recently, however, this right
has been qualified in cases where there are allegations of criminality. As
the Federal Court of Appeal stated in the refugee case of Hoang,57 "on
the authority of Hurd and Chiarelli,58 deportation [of a refugee claimant]
for serious offences affects neither s. 7 nor s. 12 rights, since it is not to
be conceptualized as either a deprivation of liberty or a punishment."59
The correctness of this conclusion is, however, questionable. The Court
failed to realize that, first, it was the return of a refugee claimant who
faced the threat of persecution that engaged the section 7 analysis in
Singh. And second, that the denial of a hearing was not in accordance
with the principles of fundamental justice. In Hoang there was no doubt
that the claimant would have faced a threat to his liberty and security of
the person were he returned. The issue the Court should have
addressed, then, is whether the deportation of a person who has been
convicted of serious criminal offences is in accordance with the second
aspect of section 7: the principles of fundamental justice.
The Federal Court is slowly moving away from the position set
down in Gittens and Hoang. The case of Grewal v. Canada (Minister of
Employment and Immigration)60 involved a permanent resident
convicted of attempted murder who sought to re-open his adjudication
hearing in order to make a refugee claim. After reviewing the
adjudicator's decision not to re-open, the Court dismissed the appeal.
However, the importance of the decision lies in the Court's recognition
that "immigration inquiries and hearings engage Charter s. 7 rights."61
54Ibid. at 692.
5 5 Waldman, supra note 20 at §2.8.
56 Supra note 14.
5 7 Supra note 45.
58 Chiarelliv. Canada (kMinister of Employment and Immigration), [1990] 2F.C. 299 (C A).
59 Supra note 57 at 41 [footnote added].
60 [1992] 1 F.C. 581 (CA) [hereinafter Grewal].
61 Waldman, supra note 20 at § 2.9. Waldman argues that this is the "most clear statement by
the Federal Court of the role that the Charter and fundamental justice will play in the immigration
process and is a clear statement by the court that the [sic] immigration law and procedure must be
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Moreover, as Waldman correctly suggests, this acknowledgement is
significant as it "means that all such procedures must be in accordance
with the principles of fundamental justice." 62
Justice Linden, for the Court, stated that "lilt has already been
determined that the deportation of refugees infringes their right to
security of the person" as held in Singh. He continued, however, to state
that "[t]his, of course, does not mean that people cannot be deported for
good reason, that is, as long as there is no violation of the principles of
fundamental justice. Thus, for example, a person may be deported if he
commits a serious crime." 63 He continued:
Hence, it is permissible to deport a permanent resident for the commission of a serious
offence without violating the Charter, as long as fundamental justice has been accorded
to that person before doing so. The question, therefore, is whether there has been a
violation of the principles of fundamental justice in this case. The legislation and the
earlier jurisprudence of this Court must yield to the dictates of section 7.64
The acknowledgement by the Federal Court that immigration inquiries
and hearings engage the Charter is significant and overdue.
The Federal Court has considered the Supreme Court's ruling in
Chiarelli on a number of occassions, two of which deserve mention here.
In Canepa v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration),65 the
Court considered the deportation of a long-term resident who had come
to Canada at age 5. He became a drug addict and to support his
addiction committed crimes. He was convicted of 37 offences, mostly for
breaking and entering and theft. The appellant was ordered deported.
Counsel for the appellant argued that deportation violated the
Charter, but also grounded her argument in the common law.
Submissions were made as follows:
[S]ections 7 and 12 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms confer the
intermediate status of "non-expellable aliens" or "de facto citizens" on immigrants who
have established a "sufficiently substantial connection" with Canada. Such persons were
said to be those who have been admitted as permanent residents at a very early age, who
have developed a deep-rooted connection with Canada by taking their schooling here,
and who have no continuing ties with their native lands.
subservient to the dictates of the Charter."
621Ibid.
63 Grewa, supra note 60 at 588.
64 /bld
65 [1992] 3 F.C. 270 (CA-) [hereinafter Canepa].
[v€oL 32 NO. 3
Fundamental (In)justice
It was contended that there was even a common law basis for such a category in the
"denizens" distinguished by Blackstone from "aliens" and "natives": Blackstone,
Commentaries on the Laws of England, [abridgement] 3rd. ed. by W.C. Sprague, 1895, at
page 65, defines a denizen as "an alien born, but who has obtained ex donatione regis
letters patent to make him an English subject: a high and incommunicable branch of the
royal prerogative." 66 [citations omitted]
Justice MacGuigan rejected the common law argument, holding that
what it outlined was de jure and not de facto status, and that the
appellant could not rely on the distinction. This novel argument, I
would suggest, does however have relevance. It serves to qualify the
near absolute lack of recognition extended to aliens at common law.
Questions that cast doubt upon historical legal assumptions about the
rights of aliens must, therefore, moderate accordingly the persuasiveness
of the common law as a source of the principles of fundamental justice.
MacGuigan J. then turned to the Charter argument.
Charter arguments, however, were precluded by the Supreme
Court of Canada decision in Chiarelli. Accordingly, the Federal Court of
Appeal held that the qualified right to remain enjoyed by permanent
residents did not violate principles of fundamental justice.67 With
respect to the threshold question of whether deportation is a violation of
liberty, the Court relied on its decisions in Hoang and Hurd to foreclose
that discussion, despite the dicta of Sopinka J. in Chiarelli, where he
explicitly left the issue open.68
When examining the appellant's claim that deportation, for him,
was cruel and unusual treatment or punishment and a violation of
section 12 of the Charter, MacGuigan J. engaged in a balancing of
interests that, I would argue, is equally relevant under, and required by,
section 7. He quoted from the unanimous decision of the Immigration
Appeal Board (Appeal Division):
In these cases the Board is required to carefully weigh the interests of Canadian society
against the interests of the individual.... In summary therefore: the appellant's lengthy
drug-related criminal record and the particular circumstances surrounding it, his
commission of a serious drug offence even after the deportation order, the absence of
dependants, the less than convincing evidence that he has completely overcome his drug
dependency and that he would not revert to criminal activity, and the lack of any
redeeming features of his twenty years in Canada, far outweigh the distress and
dislocation which removal would undoubtedly cause to the appellant and his family.69
66 Ibid at 275.
6 7 Iba. at 276.
68 /lba at 277-78.
69 bi at 283-84.
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Though upholding the deportation, the analysis that MacGuigan
J. approved of is precisely that which should be conducted under section
7. In determining whether state action is in accordance with principles
of fundamental justice it is necessary to balance individual and state
interests. Moreover, this balancing demands a narrow focus on the
interests at stake, which I would argue, ultimately enhances the accuracy
of the decisions being made.
In Nguyen v. Canada (Minister of Employment and
Immigration),70 the Federal Court of Appeal considered the application
of a permanent resident, ordered deported, who had made a refugee
claim at his inquiry. The applicant argued that both the eligibility
determination under section 46 of the Immigration Act, and deportation
under sections 27 and 32 were unconstitutional.
Justice Marceau, writing for the Court, rejected both attacks.
While this holding does not venture beyond those cases previously
mentioned, Marceau J. added a statement of some importance in
footnote 5 of his judgment:
While Sopinka J., in writing the judgment of the Supreme Court in Chiarelli, has not
considered it necessary to take a firm position on whether the issuance of a deportation
order would affect the liberty of the individual within the meaning of section 7 of the
Charter, it seems to me, with respect, that forcibly deporting an individual against his will
has the necessary effect of interfering with his liberty, in any meaning that the word can
bear, in the same manner as extradition was found to interfere in K.ndler.
The Court concluded, however, that eligibility determinations made
under the Immigration Act, and deportation, and the effect of both
provisions when operating together, did not violate the principles of
fundamental justice.
Marceau J. added the following comment at the end of his
judgment, which also deserves notice:
We have been dealing here: first, with the issuance of a deportation order, not its actual
execution to a precise country. ... It would be my opinion, however, that the Minister
would act in direct violation of the Charter if he purported to execute a deportation order
by forcing the individual concerned back to a country where, on the evidence, torture and
possibly death will be inflicted. It would be, it seems to me, participation in a cruel and
unusual treatment within the meaning of section 12 of the Charter, or, at the very least,
an outrage to public standards of decency, in violation of the principles of fundamental
justice under section 7 of the Charter. There are means to enjoin the Minister not to
commit an act in violation of the Charter.71
70 [1993] 1 F.C. 696 (CA) [hereinafter Nguyen].
71 hbid. at 708-09.
[VOL 32 No. 3
Fundamental (In)justice
Though the basis upon which the Court distinguished between
the issuance of a deportation order and its execution is less than clear (it
is possible that the Court was awaiting an appeal to the IAn), the
decision is still significant. For Marceau J., deportation becomes "an
outrage to public standards of decency" under certain conditions. And
when these conditions are met, there is, seemingly, an absolute
constitutional barrier to deportation. Thus, these dicta go further than
Singh, which required only an oral hearing.
In summary, the Federal Court has ostensibly used Chiarelli to
foreclose the question of whether deportation violates the principles of
fundamental justice, but it has also recognized that immigration
inquiries do engage the Charter and do affect constitutionally protected
interests. Finally, in obiter, the Court held in Nguyen that deportation
under certain circumstances would be an "outrage to public standards of
decency" and a violation of fundamental justice.72 The Court's use of
such language to lay the foundation for future section 7 deportation
challenges is, I suggest, a reaction to what Luc Tremblay characterizes as
"an unreasonable law." In outlining what he believes may be the
content of the principles of fundamental justice, he writes:
Perhaps the most controversial presumption at common law which could be included in
section 7 is the presumption against an unreasonable law. It brings to mind the concept
of reasonable law developed in the United States under the doctrine of substantive due
process.
However, it should be noted that the word "reasonable" as far as it is now entrenched in
section 7 of the Charter, must receive prima facie an interpretation in accordance with
the common law.7 3
Citing a line of English cases, Tremblay points to Justice Spence's
adoption of the word "reasonable" into Canadian law. In Bell v. 1, 74
Spence J. stated:
(Tihe by-law in its device ... comes exactly within Lord Russell's words as to be found to
be "such oppressive or gratuitous interference with the rights of those subject to them as
could find no justification in the minds of reasonable men." 75
Marceau J.'s holding, then, acknowledged that under particularly
extreme circumstances the courts will look beyond the procedural rights
72 Ibid. at 709.
73 "Section 7 of the Charter. Substantive Due Process?" (1984) 18 U.B.C. L Rev. 201 at 249
[footnotes omitted].
74 [1979] 2 S.C.R. 212.
75/1bu at 223.
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afforded to persons subject to deportation proceedings, and to the
substantive effects of that action.
III. DEPORTATION AND THE CHARTER: TOWARD A
RECONSIDERATION OF RIGHTS
A. Comparative Interests: What is at Stake?
Immigration's slow movement into the mainstream of public law
is taking place on a number of fronts, as has been noted by many
commentators.76 In Canada, it was first within refugee law that the
courts began to recognize the profound individual interests at issue.
Singh77 signalled an important first step. In that case, three Justices of
the Supreme Court held that section 7 of the Charter was engaged by the
"potential threat" to the security of the person faced by a refugee if
returned to the country whence he or she came.78 As Justice Wilson
stated:
It seems to me that even if one adopts the narrow approach advocated by counsel for the
Minister, "security of the person" must encompass freedom from the threat of physical
punishment or suffering as well as freedom from such punishment itself.79
Moreover, Wilson J. held that the principles of fundamental justice
included, at a minimum, the notion of procedural fairness. Considering
the seriousness of the interests at issue in the Singh case, this would
include an oral hearing.
In establishing the right to a hearing for a refugee claimant,
Wilson J., in unequivocal language rejected the deeply ingrained
presumption that "immigration is a privilege and not a right."8 0 She
stated:
I do not think this kind of analysis is acceptable in relation to the Charter. It seems to me
rather that the recent adoption of the Charter by Parliament and nine of the ten provinces
76 See, for example, Schuck, supra note 17, and "Immigration Policy and the Rights of Aliens"
(1983) 96 Harv. L. Rev. 1286 [hereinafter "Immigration Policy"], for an exhaustive enumeration of
many of the constitutional issues implicatedby immigration law.
77 Supra note 14.
78 1bid at 223ff. Beetz J., writing for two others, relied instead upon the Canadian Bill of
Rights, S.C. 1960, c. 44, s. 2(e), reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. III, to reach the same result.
79]bid. at 207.
80 Ibid. at 209. Wilson J. quoting W. Tarnopolsky, The Canadian Bill of Rights, 2d ed.
(Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1975) at 273.
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as part of the Canadian constitutional framework has sent a clear message to the courts
that the restrictive attitude which at times characterized their approach to the Canadian
BU of Rights ought to be re-examined.81
The interests at stake for refugees, including the potential consequences
if they are returned, easily bring them under the Charter's protection.
This interest-based analysis, in part a product of the post-
Nicholson82 era, has been slower to spread into the field of non-refugee
deportation where persecution is not necessarily an issue. The Federal
Court, however, has slowly acknowledged that deportation can of itself
be a deprivation of liberty and security of the person. While the Federal
Court has accepted that the deportation of a permanent resident might
violate his or her right to life, liberty and security of the person, it has
not engaged in an expansive analysis of this issue. Waldman suggests
that the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in B.C. Motor Vehicles,
which holds that imprisonment amounts to a deprivation of liberty, is
determinative of the issue. As he states, "given that a person can be
subject to detention and forcible removal from Canada as a result of an
immigration inquiry it is difficult to imagine how such a proceeding will
not engage a person's s. 7 rights."83
The critical question becomes, then, what are the principles of
fundamental justice as they are engaged by immigration law? What are
the procedural protections that must be extended? And, substantively,
what forms of treatment are simply unacceptable? It is my contention
that under particular circumstances deportation of long-term residents is
not in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice. In order to
arrive at that point, however, I shall first examine the Charter-protected
rights of liberty and security of the person.
Due to space constraints, I shall devote only limited attention to
the protected rights enumerated in section 7. While the moral weight of
this section may be found in its first stage, the more difficult legal
analysis occurs in the second stage. Furthermore, there seems to be
little intuitive difficulty in concluding that deporting an individual, and
thereby separating him or her from family and community, constitutes a
deprivation of the deportee's right to liberty, and certainly, of his or her
81 Ip
82 Supra note 37.
83 Waldman, supra note 20 at § 2.8.
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security of the person.8 4 Nevertheless, the protected rights do create a
threshold that must be overcome in order to advance to the second stage
of analysis.
In Singh, Wilson J. addressed this important threshold issue and
sought to give meaning to each of the constituent elements of section 7:
life, liberty and security of the person. She held that like liberty,
security of the person is "capable of a broad range of meaning,"85 and
referred both to the Law Reform Commission of Canada's definition of
security of the person and to Article 25 of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights (1948).86 She then suggested the following approach:
"'security of the person' must encompass freedom from the threat of
physical punishment or suffering as well as freedom from such
punishment itself."87 Admittedly, when considering the deportation of a
permanent resident as opposed to the refoulement of a refugee claimant,
the threshold is clearly different and may not involve the threat of, or
actual, physical punishment. However, as stated above, the deportation
of a permanent resident does often involve the detention and forcible
removal of that person from Canada, thus arguably engaging the right to
liberty, if not the right to security of the person, as well.
Though undecided by the Supreme Court in Chiarelli, it is settled
law at the Federal Court that immigration inquiries do engage the
Charter rights to life, liberty and security of the person. While the courts
are frequently imprecise when discussing rights violations, it has been
held on several occassions that deportation engages the rights to liberty
8 4 See P. Bryden, "Fundamental Justice and Family Class Immigration: The Example of Pangli
v. Minister of Employment and Immigration" (1991) 41 U.T.LJ. 484. Bryden observes, at 515-16, "a
judicial willingness to move our notion of constitutionally protected liberty and security interests
beyond the scope of common law or statutory entitlements, and into a realm in which judges
discover, based on some philosophical or social consensus, that what is at stake is worthy of special
protection."
Contra, P. Garant, "Fundamental Rights and Fundamental Justice" in G. Beaudoin & E.
Ratushny, eds., The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 2d ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1989) at
331. Garant takes a narrower view of security of the person. Referring to R. v. Moigentaler, [1988]
1 S.C.R. 30, she states, at 351, that "this extension of the concept of security to all forms of
psychological trauma caused by state action is extremely dangerous, in our view, unless strictly
confined to the field of criminal law."
85 Supra note 14 at 206.
8 6 Ibid. at 206-07. Wilson J. quoting the Law Reform Commission of Canada, Medical
Treatment and Ciminal Law (Ottawa: Canada (Minister of Supply and Services), 1980) [Working
Paper 26], which, at 6, states: "The right to security of the person means not only protection of one's
physical integrity, but the provision of necessaries for its support." See, ibid. at endnote 9 for the
text of Art. 25(1) of the UniversalDeclaration of Human Rights (1948).
871bid at 207.
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and security of the person 8 The more difficult task is to establish, by
re-evaluating the principles of fundamental justice as they apply to the
deportation of immigrants from Canada, a right to remain under section
7 of the Charter in cases where the individual's interests outweigh those
of the state.
B. Section 6(1) of the Charter: Citizen or Not
Section 6(1) of the Charter grants only citizens the right "to
enter, remain in and leave Canada." The implicit exclusion of
permanent residents, according to Sopinka J. in Chiarelli, provides
Parliament the basis on which to enact "conditions under which non-
citizens will be permitted to enter and remain in Canada.18 9 It is a
disputable presumption, however, that s. 6(1), by virtue of its exclusion
of non-citizens, creates an all or nothing constitutional protection
regime. This would give to citizenship a constitutional significance that
does not correspond to the factual reality. Moreover, it would
perpetuate and constitutionalize the formalistic classification to which
aliens have been subject at common law.
In regard to this classification, Wood argues that after a certain
period of time an alien becomes absorbed into the state-community and
is no longer subject to the immigration power. He then criticizes
citizenship as a determinant of significant rights:
[Flor persons other than immigrants, [citizenship] is obtained very easily, simply by being
born in Australia. It is not asked of native-born Australians, what family, social, or
economic ties, for instance, they have with Australia. Despite the fact that it is scarcely
treated as controversial, it seems quite arbitrary to take birth as the relevant criterion.
What seems to make this choice plausible is the general (but certainly not universal) truth
that most persons spend some period of time in the country in which they are born. It is
the latter which gives rise to any genuine moral right to reside permanently in the country
rather than the former. It is through living in a country that one develops any real
connection with it.90
88 In Singh, supra note 14 at 206-07, deportation was held to engage the security of the person.
In Hoang, supra note 45 at 41, the Court held that deportation was not to be conceptualized as a
deprivation of liberty. In Grewal, supra note 60 at 587, the Court held that deportation engaged the
right to life, liberty and security of the person. Finally, in Nguyen, supra note 70 at footnote 5, the
Court ruled that "forcibly deporting an individual against his will has the necessary effect of
interfering with his liberty."
89 Chiarell, supra note 15 at 733-34.
90 Wood, supra note 41 at 299.
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There are good reasons why those born in a country shall be citizens.
Namely, there would be no other country to which those persons would
belong. Moreover, what would happen with children of illegal
immigrants? Wood makes a valid point, however, in questioning the
legitimacy of the distinction between citizen and immigrant.
The fact that in Canada section 6(1) of the Charter does not
include permanent residents, refugees, or other non-citizens, does not
mean that they have no rights under the Constitution. Just as section 7
has functioned as a residual with respect to a number of the legal rights
contained in sections 8 to 14,91 so, I would suggest, should it serve the
same purpose with respect to a non-citizen's right to remain. While it
was acknowledged by Sopinka J. in Chiarelli that immigrants enjoy a
limited right to remain, the nature of this statutory right seems
contractual rather than constitutional. "[P]ermanent residents described
in section 27(1)(d)(ii)" and thereby subject to deportation, Sopinka J.
stated, "have all deliberately violated an essential condition under which
they were permitted to remain in Canada."92 In approaching the
Charter, however, courts must employ a more purposive interpretation.
Given "the diminishing relevance of the status of formal citizenship to
the allocation of extrapolitical rights,"93 a formalistic interpretation that
would exclude from the Charter the right to remain for non-citizens
seems untenable. The disassociation of citizenship from the distribution
of societal rights, moreover, mirrors, or is perhaps a symptom of, a
conceptual change toward notions of sovereignty. Judith Lichtenberg
suggests that "[n]ational boundaries are increasingly less relevant, and
are already much less relevant than is ordinarily supposed, to
determining whose interests must be considered."9 4 Similarly, under the
Charter, dubious conceptions should not form the basis for the
distribution of constitutional rights.
91 See the discussion of LamerJ. (as he then was) in B.C Motor Vehicles, supra note 46.
92 Charli supra note 15.
93 
"Immigration Policy," supra note 76 at 734. This statement is made in the broader context
of a discussion of Plyer v. Doe 102 U.S. 2382 (1982), where the United States Supreme Court held
that the state of Texas had an obligation to extend the benefit of education to undocumented alien
children in the community.
94 "National Boundaries and Moral Boundaries: A Cosmopolitan View" in P. Brown & H.
Shue, eds., Boundaries: National Autonomy and its Limits (Totowa, NJ.: Rowman & Littlefield,
1981) at 92; see also H. Shue, "Exporting Hazards," in the same collection at 107.
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C. Section 7 of the Charter: The Right to Life, Liberty and Security of the
Person
If section 7 of the Charter encompasses a residual protection of
the right to remain for non-citizens, what is the nature of that protection,
and what is its breadth? To argue that section 7 is merely a repository
for that which cannot be accommodated in other Charter sections would
be to underestimate its significance, particularly in relation to
deportation. That which is protected by section 7 certainly includes the
liberty and security interests that are engaged by deportation
proceedings. So while section 7 might contain certain protections that
are found elsewhere in the Charter, it is unnecessary to stretch it to
include rights that are squarely within its boundaries. The role of other
Charter provisions in interpreting the principles of fundamental justice,
as a related issue, will be discussed below.95
The determination of whether there has been a deprivation of
life, liberty and security of the person is the necessary first step to
determining if there has been a violation of section 7 of the Charter.
Only if there is such a deprivation is it necessary to determine whether
that deprivation is in accordance with the principles of fundamental
justice. The two stages of the analysis, however, are intertwined. As La
Forest J., writing for the majority in R. v. Lyons,96 stated:
It is ... clear that the requirements of fundamental justice are not immutable; rather, they
vary according to the context in which they are invoked. Thus certain procedural
protections might be constitutionally mandated in one context but not in another.9 7
It is presumed that La Forest J.'s statement is equally suited to
considerations of substantive justice under section 7. Lamer J. also
stated in B.C. Motor Vehicles that the principles of fundamental justice
"cannot be given any exhaustive content or simple enumerative
definition, but will take on concrete meaning as the courts address
alleged violations of s. 7."98 Evans, too, notes the relationship between
the broadened scope of interests protected under section 7 and the
concomitant protections that must follow from it-protections rooted in
the duty of fairness, and as such, included within fundamental justice.
He states:
95 See Part m.C2.a), below.
96 [1987 2 S.C.R. 309.
97 1bid. at 361 (as cited by Sopinka J. in Chiarell supra note 15 at 743).
98 Supra note 46 at 513.
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While the courts may have been slow in the past to protect the interests in personal
liberty of such typically powerless groups as inmates of prisons and psychiatric facilities,
parolees, and those subject to immigration control and deportation, they ought to see in
section 7 evidence of the high societal value placed on the individual interests there
described, and give them their due weight when determining the procedural protections
appropriate as a matter of common lawY9 [footnotes omitted]
In Chiarelli Sopinka J. did not engage in the first step of the
analysis, and I would argue, in not doing so failed to establish the context
in which the principles of fundamental justice ought to have been
determined. The first stage is, to some extent, determinative of the
analysis that follows. In an article that persuasively argues for the
protection of the continued receipt of welfare benefits under section 7 of
the Charter, Ian Johnstone makes a similar point. He states that "[s]ince
the two branches of s. 7 are inter-related, the values implicit in the
principles of fundamental justice are concretized when attached to
substantive interests."100 Finally, it may be useful to draw an analogy to
the analysis that takes place under other Charter sections. When
considering the scope of freedom of expression under section 2(b), the
Supreme Court has indicated that expression directed toward (a)
seeking and attaining the truth; (b) fostering participation in social and
political decision making; and (c) cultivating diversity in forms of
individual self-fulfilment, lies at the core of this Charter freedom.101
Thus, limitations that impinge upon expression promoting any of those
values will be subject to more vigorous scrutinyj1 2 Similarly, it may be
argued that under section 7 a clear definition of the interests at stake is
critical to determining the requirements of fundamental justice in each
case. Presumably, where the interest engaged lies closer to the "core"
values of section 7, the principles of fundamental justice that limit that
interest will be scrutinized with greater zealousness. In determining
what lies at the core of section 7, guidance may be taken from the words
of the section itself: life, liberty and security of the person.
99 Supra note 51 at 80.
100 I. Johnstone, "Section 7 of the Charter and Constitutionally Protected Welfare" (1988)
U.T. Fac. L Rev. I at 7 [footnote omitted].
101 See In Toy Ltd v. Quebec (AG.), [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927 at 976.
102 SeeR. v. Kegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697.
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1. Principles of fundamental justice
In order to contextualize the principles of fundamental justice,
one must first examine precisely what interests are at stake. In the case
of a refugee, the interests of security of the person and freedom from
physical or threatened violence are clear, as stated in Singh. In the case
of a permanent resident or long-term illegal resident who faces
deportation to a country where he or she has never lived, is, perhaps,
unable to speak the language, and would be separated from family and
community, the threat to liberty and security of the person is also quite
acute. Finally, the threatened deportation of a visitor with no communal
ties to Canada engages decidedly different interests. Simply put, it is
critical not to overlook the first stage of a section 7 analysis if the second
stage is to be adequately contextualized for a well informed and
thoughtful consideration of the principles of fundamental justice.
Once the interests are contextualized it is necessary to, first,
determine what the principles of fundamental justice are in that
situation; and second, to balance the competing interests of the
individual and the state to determine whether a given procedure accords
with those principles. Justice La Forest addressed this in Thomson
Newspapers Ltd. v. Canada (Director of Investigation and Research,
Restrictive Trade Practices Commission),103 where he stated:
What these practices have sought to achieve is a just accommodation between the
interests of the individual and those of the state, both of which factors play a part in
assessing whether a particular law violates the principles of fundamental justice. The
interests in the area with which we are here concerned involve particularly delicate
balancing.104 [citations omitted]
And as was stated by Justice Cory in R. v. Wholesale Travel Group Inc.,1 05
when assessing this balance, context remains crucial:
It is now clear that the Charter is to be interpreted in light of the context in which the
claim arises. Context is relevant both with respect to the delineation of the meaning and
scope of Charter rights, as well as to the determination of the balance to be struck between
inddual rights and the interests ofsociey. 06 [emphasis added]
The Court again returns to the importance of focusing narrowly on the
interests at stake in each case-a step that was not taken in Chiarelli.
103 [1990] 1 S.C.L 425 (cited in Chiare/li, supra note 15 at 744).
104 bid. at 539.
105 [1991] 3 S.C.R. 154 (cited in Chiareld supra note 15 at 732).
106 /bAU at 226.
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The principles of fundamental justice can be drawn from a
variety of sources. In determining which strands should be accorded
interpretive weight, and which should be discarded, it is necessary that a
court take an expansive view of, and assess critically, all the information
before it. But determining where to find the principles of fundamental
justice may prove difficult at times. The Supreme Court, however, has
provided some guidance on where courts should be looking to find these
principles.
The sources to which the courts may turn in a given case include
those principles that are "found in the basic tenets of our legal system,"
that lie "in the inherent domain of the judiciary as guardian of the justice
system" and not in the realm of "general public policy." They include
those principles that are recognized as "essential elements of [any]
system for the administration of justice [that] is founded upon a belief in
the dignity and worth of the human person and the rule of law."1107 The
ambiguity of these phrases suggest that the principles of fundamental
justice can be ascertained from any number of sources: these would
include other Charter provisions, the jurisprudence of other free and
democratic societies, customary and conventional international law, and
the common law, among others.108
a) International sources of fundamental justice
The Supreme Court has recognized that Canada's international
obligations serve as one particularly rich interpretive source.109 Chief
Justice Dickson, writing in dissent in Reference Re Public Service
Employee Relations Act (Alta.),110 stated:
A body of treaties ... and customary norms now constitute an international law of human
rights under which the nations of the world have undertaken to adhere to the standards
and principles necessary for ensuring freedom, dignity and social justice for their citizens.
The Charter conforms to the spirit of this contemporary international human rights
movement, ahd it incorporates many of the policies and prescriptions of the various
10 7 E. Colvin, "Section Seven of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms" (1989) 68
Can. Bar Rev. 560 at 568. Colvin arrives at this definition of fundamental justice by consolidating
passages from the judgment of Lamer J. (as he then was) in B.C. Motor Vehicles, supra note 46 at
503,512.
108 See, generally, Hogg, supra note 13 at s. 33.8.
109 See A. Bayefsky, International Human Rights Law: Use in Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms Litigation (Toronto: Butterworths, 1992); see also W. Schabas, International Human Rights
Law and the Canadian CharterA Manualfor the Practitioner (Toronto: Carswell, 1991).
110 [19871 1 S.C.R. 313.
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international documents pertaining to human rights. The various sources of international
human rights law-declarations, covenants, conventions, judicial and quasi-judicial
decisions of international tribunals, customary norms-rmus in my opinion, be relevant and
persuasive sourcesfor interpretation of the Charter's provisions.
The content of Canada's international human rights obligations is, in my view, an
important indicia of the meaning of the "full benefit of the Charter's protection." I
believe that the Charter should generally be presumed to provide protection at least as
great as that afforded by similar provisions in international human rights documents
which Canada has ratified.111 [emphasis added]
Beyond looking to treaties to which Canada is a signatory,
Canadian courts may find instruction from other international sources.
Though Canada is not a party to the European Convention,112 Anne
Bayefsky, in her text on the use of international human rights law in
interpreting the Charter, states:
Canadian courts have traditionally made some mention of non-binding sources of law
from other jurisdictions ... for the purpose of formulating informed responses to domestic
legal questions. ... Furthermore, for the European Convention on Human Rights and
associated jurisprudence (to which 85 percent of the [Supreme Court of Canada
references to international human rights law] refer), additional justification can be found.
Much of Canadian legal tradition is inherited from the United Kingdom. That state itself
is a party to the European Convention, and the Convention has been used in British
courts to interpret British law. As well, the drafting history and actual provisions of the
European Convention are closely related to the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
The sophisticated quasi-judicial and judicial system associated with the European
Convention (unlike that of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights) makes the
jurisprudence of the European Convention helpful in understanding Canada's obligations
under the Covenant.113
Thus, the Convention serves to both provide guidance in interpreting the
Charter and to clarify Canada's international obligations under the
ICCPR (which in turn, serves as a significant interpretive source for the
Charter).
Other free and democratic societies provide another source of
jurisprudence useful for interpreting the Charter. The case law of the
European Community may be of particular benefit in defining the
principles of fundamental justice under section 7. While Community law
begins with the presumption of free movement under Article 48 of the
111 Ibid. at 348-49. The latter part of this statement was adopted by Dickson CJ.C., speaking
for the majority, in Slaight Communications Inc. v. Davidson, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1038 at 1056.
1 12 See Schabas, supra note 109 at 255, for the text of the European Convention; and Bayefsky,
supra note 109 at 619, for the text of the ICCPR.
1 13 Supra note 109 at 111. Schabas, supra note 109 at 57, makes a similar argument for the use
of the European Convention, comparing its interpretive value to that of the American Bill of Rights,
U.S. Const. amends. I - X.
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European Economic Community Treaty,114 movement may be curtailed
where it interferes with a sovereign state's interests, which include the
right of a state to take measures to maintain public policy, public
security, and public order. What Community member states consider to
be public policy, public security, and public order concerns, and for
which interests they will exercise their sovereignty, provide further
insight into what are considered to be fundamental interests by
European nations. Also informative is the extent to which the European
Court of Justice permits these concerns of nation-states to derogate
from the right of free movement, which is subject only to the European
Union's concept of ordre public. Most importantly, these judgments
exhibit the kind of balancing of individual and state interests that should
take place under the Charter.
Two basic principles can be found from the case law: Free
movement may only be curtailed when there is a serious threat to public
interests; and, secondly, a state may not justify, in the name of public
policy, the differential treatment of nationals of other member states
and its own citizens for the purposes of law enforcement. Though
premised on free movement, both of these principles would,
nevertheless, support an interpretation of section 7 that precludes the
deportation of long-term residents save when they pose a serious and
continuing risk to the safety and order of Canada.
In R. v. Bouchereau,11 5 the Court of Justice of the European
Communities interpreted the scope of the public policy proviso that
limits the guarantee of free movement under Article 48 of the Treaty. It
held that deportation could only be ordered in limited circumstances,
and not against a person convicted of minor drug offences. The Court
interpreted the clause as follows:
In so far as it may justify certain restrictions on the free movement of persons subject to
Community law, recourse by a national authority to the concept of public policy
presupposes, in any event, the existence, in addition to the perturbation of the social
order which any infringement of the law involves, of a genuine and sufficiently serious
threat to the requirements of public policy affecting one of the fundamental interests of
society1 1 6
114 See Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, Treaties Establishing the
European Communities, abridged ed. (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European
Communities, 1987) at 167-68.
115 (No. 30177), [19771 CJ.E.C., 2 C.M.LR. 800.
116 Ibd. at 825.
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Thus, it is clear that states may only rely upon their residual discretion
under the Treaty where there is a serious, continuing, and profound
threat to a fundamental interest.
In Adoui v. Belgium117 the Court reviewed the actions of
Belgium, which expelled non-national female prostitutes on the basis of
public policy considerations. It was argued that Belgium was violating
the Treaty by taking measures against prostitution engaged in by
nationals of other member states while not prosecuting, and effectively
disregarding, similar activities of its own nationals to the extent that
those activities were criminal. The Court held that a member state could
not treat non-national criminals differently from local criminals in order
to protect the public. In fact, prostitution, which was not criminally
punishable in Belgium, could hardly be said to violate the ordrepublic.
How can this aid in interpreting the Charter as it applies to
immigrants subject to deportation? The Treaty establishes a right to
remain subject to certain extreme exceptions, and it may be argued that
our Charter imposes similar requirements with respect to long-term
residents. Jurisdictions that face similar challenges of balancing
individual and state interests have established that persons should only
be deported where there is a clear and present danger to society. And so
should our Charter be read. The state's sovereign power remains;
however, the principles of fundamental justice require that those
individuals who are established in Canada, and who do not pose a
significant risk, have a right to remain and cannot be deported.
b) The common law
The common law, as many commentators suggest, remains a
particularly important-if not the most important-source of the
principles of fundamental justice. But fundamental justice certainly
includes more than the common law duty of fairness. And one of the
issues that courts and commentators have been struggling with is
precisely how much more fundamental justice requires. Though
advocating a cautious approach to the development of section 7, Evans
suggests that there are circumstances in which the courts should move
beyond the common law. He states:
It should only be necessary to resort directly to the Charter when a ground of judicial
review that would otherwise have been available at common law has clearly been
117 (No. 115/81 & 116/81), [1982] CJ.E.C., 3 C.M.L.R. 631.
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abrogated by statute, or when the existing common law of judicial review does not give to
a Charter right the degree of protection that the applicant is seeking.118
The principles of fundamental justice move beyond the common law in
so far as they cannot be limited by statute. Moreover, the Charter has
placed a "high societal value" on particular interests delineated therein,
and can be "invoked as a source of a new legal right."119
And while certain interests will enjoy an enhanced constitutional
recognition, what is the concomitant degree of enhancedprotection to be
had under the Charter? Is fundamental justice concerned merely with
procedure or does it include substantive protection as well? Although
the Supreme Court has attempted to avoid the difficulties raised by this
question,12 0 I suggest that fundamental jutice is concerned with both
procedural and substantive protection 21 Where a particular interest
triggers the operation of section 7, fundamental justice requires that
interest to be given sufficient protection, whether that is done
procedurally 2 2 or through substantive intervention by the courts.123 As
Wilson J. stated in her concurring opinion in B.C. Motor Vehicles, "it is
hard to see why one's life and liberty should be protected against
procedural injustice and not against substantive injustice."12 4
Sufficient protection can only be given to the liberty and security
interests of permanent residents who have breached a condition of their
status in Canada, or to long-term illegals if deportation is found to be
118 Evans, supra note 51 at 57.
119 Ibi& at 73, 80.
12 0 See Hogg, supra note 13 at s. 44.10(a), where he states that "the distinction has never been
clear. ... The Court's decision in the B.C. Motor Vehicle Reference does spare us that order of
argumenL"
121 See Tremblay, supra note 73 at 252, where he states: "The principles [of fundamental
justice] can deal with the procedural content of the law, such as a fair hearing, or with the
substantive content of the law, such as the requirement of mens rea as a constituent part of a crime."
122 See Singh, supra note 14, where the principles of fundamental justice required that a
refugee claimant be granted an oral hearing.
123 See B.C. Motor Vehicles, supra note 46: an absolute liability offence where there is the
possibility of imprisonment violated fundamental justice; and see R. v.Morgentaler, supra note 84,
where it was held that the requirement that an abortion be approved by a therapeutic abortion
committee violated the principles of fundamental justice both in terms of procedure and, per
Wilson 3., substantively in its interference with a woman's right to choose. See Colvin, supra note
107 at 571, where he states that "[i]n both cases, the Supreme Court reviewed features of legislative
schemes which could be viewed as means to the achievement of social ends. Neither case, however,
offers much support for a power to review the justice of the social ends which are pursued through
legal means."
124 Supra note 46 at 531.
[VOL 32 No. 3
Fundamental (In)justice
unjust. To focus upon deportation as either a substantive or procedural
concern is to unnecessarily complicate the argument. 1 5 An attack upon
deportation procedures under the Immigration Act would be unlikely to
succeed given that the Act provides two levels of impartial decision
makers, broad grounds of appeal, and the possibility of judicial review
(though decidedly less procedural protections are engaged by the
deportation of an illegal). Similarly, to label deportation as a substantive
violation of the principles of fundamental justice is, perhaps, to
overshoot the mark. What is required is a more delicately textured
approach that sufficiently contextualizes the state's action vis a vis the
individual. Simply put, the courts must identify the individual interests
at stake and, when balanced against the state's interests, determine
whether deportation is constitutional under those circumstances.
Such an approach is supported by the decision of the Supreme
Court of Canada in B.C. Motor Vehicles. As Lamer J., as he then was,
stated, citing Dickson J. inBigMDrugMart,126 "[t]he task of the Court is
not to choose between substantive or procedural content per se but to
secure for persons 'the full benefit of the Charter's protection.' "127 The
enactment of the Charter requires the courts to interpret legislation in a
manner consistent with the Charter's provisions. 128 Attributing a narrow
and strictly procedural interpretation to "principles of fundamental
justice" will, as Lamer J. stated, increase the "possibility that individuals
may be deprived of these most basic rights. This latter result is to be
125 For a different view see B. Jackman, "Advocacy, Immigration and the Charter" (1990) 9
Imm. L R. (2d) 286 at 297, where she states: "The Charter has been restricted to date essentially to
the re~pgnition of procedural protections. There has not been a decision which recognises any
purely substantive rights of aliens under the Charter."
See also E. Morgan, "Aliens and Process Rights: An Open and Shut Case of Legal
Sovereignty" (1988) 7 Wisc. Int'L LJ. 107, for a more theoretical analysis of the interaction between
procedure and substance within the context of international law. Constitutional law, he argues, at
125, has become co-opted by principles of international sovereignty.
The irony ... is that the benevolent discourse of constitutional rights has become the primary
medium in which to express the traditional attitude of national insulation, the increasing
openness of process thereby deflecting attention from continuing closure of substance ...
The historical pattern of Canadian immigration law, therefore, may be said to be one of
movement in terms of process and stagnation in terms of substance.
126 [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295.
127 Supra note 46 at 499.
128 The issue of whether courts should be intervening in deportation issues and introducing
their value judgments in place of an elected Parliament, particularly at present in light of the
public's seeming dissatisfaction with immigration policy, is outside the scope of this paper.
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avoided given that the rights involved are as fundamental as those which
pertain to life, liberty and securty of the person."129
c) Other Charter provisions
It is incumbent upon the courts not only to look at "the character
and the larger objects of the Charter,"130 but also to look at other Charter
provisions when interpreting section 7. Deportation operates at the
intersection of a number of Charter guarantees. These include the "right
not to be tried ... and punished for an offence" more than once (section
11(h)); the "right not to be subjected to cruel and unusual treatment or
punishment" (section 12); and "the right to equal protection and benefit
of the law" (section 15). When considering the principles of
fundamental justice under section 7, the courts should find instruction in
sections 11(h), 12, and 15. Under particular circumstances, can
deportation be conceived as a punishment that is being imposed after a
person has already been convicted under another act of Parliament?131
Can deportation be perceived as cruel and unusual treatment?132 Does
deportation subject immigrants who have been convicted of criminal acts
to a more severe punishment than citizens convicted of those same
acts?133 While deportation may not violate any of these sections
standing alone, the larger objects that they seek to protect may
nevertheless be engaged. Other sections of the Charter should guide the
courts in identifying the principles of fundamental justice. Therefore,
even if the above-mentioned sections are only tangentially engaged by
deportation they should still be considered under section 7.
d) European Convention materials
The European Convention134 provides a particularly fruitful
source of interpretation for the Charter. The European Court of Human
129 Supra note 46 at 501.
13 0 Big MDrg Mart, supra note 126 at 344.
131 In Hurd, supra note 38, it was held that the answer is no: Deportation is not punishment
and therefore not double jeopardy.
132 See Chiarel!i supra note 15, where it was held that deportation does not violate s. 12. But
also see Nguyen, supra note 70, per Marceau J.
133 See Chiarelli, supra note 15, where deportation was held not to violate s. 15 of the Charter.
134 Supra note 3.
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Rights has heard a number of cases involving the deportation of long-
term residents, and it is instructive to examine the approach taken by
that Court. Article 8.1 of the European Convention states:
Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his
correspondence.
This section alone, and in conjunction with other Convention sections,
has been held to preclude the deportation of an individual where there
would be a significant interference with his or her family life!3 5
Violations of Article 8.1 may be justified under Article 8.2, however,
where it is shown that the interference is (a) in accordance with the law,
(b) in pursuit of a legitimate aim, and (c) necessary in a democratic
society. The following decisions outline the Court's developing
interpretation of the right to family life, and show under what
circumstances such a violation can be justified. The cases decided under
this Article of the European Convention illustrate the appropriate
balance to be struck, or at a minimum, the factors that ought to be
considered, when courts scrutinize oppressive government action vis a vis
an individual and, as a consequence, his or her family.
In the earlier case of Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v. United
Kingdom,13 6 the European Court of Human Rights gave a restrictive
interpretation to Article 8 of the Convention when balanced against state
sovereignty. It was stated that
[t]he Court cannot ignore that the present case is concerned not only with family life but
also with immigration, and that, as a matter of well-established international law and
subject to its treaty obligations, a State has a right to control the entry of non-nationals
into its territory....
The duty imposed by Article 8 cannot be considered as extending to a general obligation
on the part of a Contracting State to respect the choice by married couples of the country
of their matrimonial residence and to accept the non-national spouses for settlement in
that country.13 7
The case was brought by immigrant women in the United
Kingdom who were not permitted to sponsor their spouses. The law
stated that only women who were citizens could sponsor their husbands.
This differed from the situation as it applied to non-citizen men, who
were entitled to sponsor their wives. Though the Court did not find a
135 Seinfa note 150.
136 (1985), 7 E.H.R.R. 471 (European Court of Human Rights) [hereinafterAbdulaziz].
1371bid. at §§ 67-68.
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violation of Article 8, the immigration rules were held to have
constituted discrimination on the basis of sex.
Moustaquim v. Belgium138 signalled a fundamental shift in Article
8 jurisprudence. A Moroccan national who had lived in Belgium since
the age of two was deported after being convicted of a number of
offences, both as a juvenile and as an adult. The Court had little
difficulty in finding a violation of Paragraph 1 of Article 8. It was stated:
The measure complained of resulted in his being separated from [his family] for more
than five years, although he tried to remain in touch by correspondence. There was
accordingly interference by a public authority with the right to respect for family life
guaranteed in Paragraph 1 of Article 8.139
Under Paragraph 2 of Article 8, the Court found the deportation
to be in accordance with the law and that it served a legitimate aim.
However, it was found not to be necessary in a democratic society; that
is, not "justified by a pressing social need and, in particular,
proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued."140 The Court balanced
the interests of the state against those of the applicant as follows. The
offences were
spread over a fairly short period. ... There was ... a relatively long interval between [them]
and the deportation order. ... All the applicant's close relatives ... had been living in Liege
for a long while.... Mr. Moustaquim himself was less than two years old when he arrived
in Belgium.1 41
The Court concluded:
Having regard to these various circumstances, it appears that, as far as respect for the
applicant's family life is concerned, a proper balance was not achieved between the
interests involved, and the means employed was [sic] therefore disproportionate to the
legitimate aim pursued. Accordingly, there was a violation of Article 8.142
This balancing analysis is familiar to us under section 1 of the Charter.
The scope of Paragraph 2 of Article 8 was given an even narrower
interpretation in the following case, where the criminality at issue was
more serious.
138 (1991), Series A. No. 193 (European Court of Human Rights) [hereinafter Moustaquim].
13 9 1i. at 18.
14 0 b I at 19.
141 Ibd
142 bid. at 20.
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In the case of BeIdjoudi v. France,143 a lifetime resident of France
was convicted of a number of serious offences and was ordered
deported. He argued that the deportation order violated his right to
respect for his private and family life1 44 pursuant to Paragraph 1 of
Article 8, and that the deportation could not be justified under
Paragraph 2 of Article 8.
The Court held that deportation violated Paragraph 1 of Article
8 of the Convention. Concerning Paragraph 2, the government asserted
its interests as follows. They argued that Mr. Beldjoudi had committed a
large number of serious offences over a period of fifteen years, all of
them during his adult life. The sentences totalled over ten years in
prison; the crimes continued even after the deportation order was
served; and, "[iln short, the dangerous character of Mr. Beldjoudi meant
that his presence on French territory could not be tolerated by the
community."'145 These very serious state concerns were balanced against
the applicant's interests. This case, it was stated, differed from
Moustaquim, as the criminality was far more serious. However, weighing
against this was the fact that the applicant, an Algerian, had lost his
French nationality when he was a minor; his wife was a French citizen;
and he had lived in France for 40 years. The Court concluded that
"[h]aving regard to these various circumstances, it appears, from the
point of view of respect for the applicant's family life, that the decision
to deport Mr. Beldjoudi, if put into effect, would not be proportionate to
the legitimate aim pursued and would therefore violate Article 8."146
The separate concurring opinion of de Meyer J. is also
instructive. He concluded that "[w]hile it is true, as the documents in
the case show, that Mr. Beldjoudi has already been convicted of
numerous offences, mostly comparatively serious ones, and is now once
more under suspicion of having committed others, he can be sufficiently
punished for these by the criminal law."147 De Meyer J. acknowledged
that Mr. Beljoudi had become a de facto citizen of France, which
precluded treating him differently from French nationals for his criminal
activity.
143 (1992), Series A. No. 234-.A (European Court of Human Rights) [hereinafter Beldjou&].
144 bid at 25.
145 Ibi. at 27.
146 ba at 28.
147iW. at 35 [footnote omitted].
1994]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL [VOL 32 NO. 3
In a further concurring opinion, Martens J. stated in very
unequivocal terms that deportation is unacceptable treatment for long-
term residents. A portion of his judgment is excerpted below.
Paragraph 1 of Article 3 of Protocol No. 4 to the [European] Convention forbids the
expulsion of nationals. In a Europe where a second generation of immigrants is already
raising children (and where violent xenophobia is increasing to an alarming extent) it is
high time to ask ourselves whether this ban should not apply equally to aliens who were
born and bred in a member State or who have otherwise, by virtue of long residence,
become fully integrated there (and, conversely, become completely segregated from their
country of origin).
In my opinion, mere nationality does not constitute an objective and reasonable
justification for the existence of a difference as regards the admissibility of expelling
someone from what, in both cases, may be called his "own country."... I believe that an
increasing number of member States of theCouncil of Europe accept the principle that
such "integrated aliens" should be no more liable to expulsion than nationals, an
exception being justified, if at All, only in very exceptional circumstances....
I would have preferred the Court's decision in the present case to have been based on the
aforesaid principle, coupled with a finding that there were no very exceptional
circumstances justifying a departure therefrom. A judgment along those lines would have
achieved what the Moustaquim v. Belgium and the present judgment have failed to do,
namely introduce a measure of legal certainty, this seems highly desirable, especially in
this field. 148
Martens J. also would have found a violation of the right to
private life under Article 8 of the Convention. The interests considered
with respect to privacy are similar to those advanced concerning family
life.
To sum up: I think that expulsion, especially (as in the present case) to a country where
living conditions are markedly different from those in the expelling country and where
the deportee, as a stranger to the land, its culture and its inhabitants, runs the risk of
having to live in almost total social isolation, constitutes interference with his right to
respect for his private life.1 49 [footnotes omitted]
In both Moustaquim and Beldjoudi, the interests considered by
the Court do not differ greatly from those that are considered by the AD
on appeals in equity from deportation orders. The significance of these
decisions, however, is that they create a supra-national obligation upon
states and they are subject to adjudication by a Court in the fullest sense.
Extending this to our Canadian context, I would argue that it is not for
the LAD to conclude that under particular circumstances a person should
benefit from equitable considerations and not be deported; it should not
be open to the LAD to make that determination at all. Certain persons,
148 Ibid. at 37.
149 Ibid. at 38.
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by virtue of their long-term residence, their family, their community ties,
and other factors, ought to have a supra-legislative, or constitutional,
right to remain. What is suggested is a constitutional restraint on the
power to deport, pursuant to section 7 of the Charter, that would involve
a kind of equitable balancing similar to that currently engaged in by the
LAD. Such balancing, moreover, would be sufficiently broad to
encompass a respect for, and a protection of, family life similar to that
which is outlined in Article 8 of the European Convention. This would be
acknowledged, first, in the recognition that deportation affects the
personal liberty and security of a deportee who is being separated from
his or her family and community. Second, it would be acknowledged
that the principles of fundamental justice recognize the family as the
basic social unit, and would therefore protect against such interference.
Using Article 8 to animate section 7 of the Charter differs little, in
principle, from using other Charter sections to similar effect. Moreover,
in European Convention jurisprudence, violations are often grounded
upon the combined operation of two or more Articles.150
e) The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
Canada's obligations under the ICCPRI51 give rise to another
source from where the principles of fundamental justice may be drawn.
Article 23.1 of the ICCPR states:
The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to
protection by society and the State.
The language of Article 23.1 is stronger than that of the European
Convention, which accords only "the right to respect for ... private and
family life"-something less than protection. Thus, given the more
forceful language, it would seem that Canada's international obligations
as a signatory to the ICCPR are at least as demanding as the protection
required under Article 8 of the European Convention.
The Human Rights Commission of Australia, in a report entitled
Human Rights and the Deportation of Convicted Aliens and Immigrants,152
150 See Abdulaziz, supra note 136, where a violation of respect for family life (Art. 8) was
found in concert with a violation of freedom from discrimination (Art. 14).
15 1 Supra note 3.
152 Report No. 4 (Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1983). The report
states:
The [Australian Human Rights] Commission notes that the European Commission has
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considered whether Article 23.1 was engaged in deportation cases. The
commission stated:
The very fact that a family is in existence, and that its interests must be protected and
promoted, places on those making deportation decisions an obligation to deport only
when there is a greater interest at stake than that of protecting the family, and, in
particular, the children, irrespective of whether they were born in Australia.153
Drawing on conventional international law, there are a number of
reasons for including under section 7 the protection of the family. First,
the ICCPR calls for this protection in unequivocal terms. Second, the
European Court of Human Rights has, in interpreting the European
Convention (a document that shares many similarities with the
ICCPR),15 4 extended significant protection to the family against the
deportation of one of its members. Finally, beyond the ICCPR, Canada
is enjoined by other international treaties that it has signed, including
the Convention on the Rights of the Child,155 which recognize and protect
similar rights and interests. While some of these conventions have
neither been widely applied nor received much analytical attention, I
would suggest that they add strength to the argument against
deportation where it would result in the separation of the family unit.
f) Community as a source of rights
The movement away from classical immigration law and
"theories of obligation derived ... from the forms of consent by a
considered the nature of the obligation towards the family in exclusion cases pursuant to
complaints under Article 8 of the European Convention. The language of Article 8 is
somewhat different from that of Article 23.1 ... but if anything it might be considered that
the ICCPR language imposes stronger protections. ... The Commission considers that, in
certain circumstances, e.g. where an alien of long-standing residence in Australia has
established a family in Australia and, in particular, where children of the family have
grown up in Australia, deportation could amount to an infringement of ... Article 23.1 of
the ICCPR.
The Report also suggests that deportation could amount to an infringement of Article 17
(arbitrary interference with one's family); Article 24 (protection of the rights of a child); and the
Declaration of the Rights of the Child, Principle 6 (a child shall grow up in the care of his or her
family and not be separated therefrom).
153 Ibi 4
154 See Bayefsky, supra note 109 at 111, where she states that the "actual provisions of the
European Convention are closely related to the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights."
155 U.N. Doc. AIRESI44125. The Convention was concluded on 20 November 1989 and
entered into force on 2 September 1990. It was signed by Canada on 28 May 1990 but was not yet
ratified as of 1 January 1991.
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sovereign government" leads toward a "new communitarian ethos that
grounds obligation in social relationships and notions of substantive
justice."15 6 It is from the community, then, and the relationships that
bind persons to their families and their society, that the courts should
look to find yet another source of rights to aid in the interpretation of
section 7 of the Charter. It is outside the scope of this paper to analyze
in detail the distinction between formal citizenship in a sovereign state
and membership in a sub-state community. However, it is clear enough
that the two represent different types of associations that give rise to
different webs of rights and obligations.
Citizenship is no longer the basis for the distribution of many
government benefits and social rights. While there are a few privileges
that remain within the exclusive domain of citizenship, their numbers
and significance are declining. Instead, it is being increasingly
recognized, that "community" gives rise to certain rights for those who
do not enjoy the status of citizenship. Community, in its broadest sense,
may include simply a sustained presence in a country. And for some
commentators it is nothing more than time that ought to give rise to an
individual's constitutionally protected status, free from the exercise of
the immigration power. Wood's radical suggestion is that citizenship
itself should be dismantled and replaced with something earned.
"Persons born in Australia, then, should not be regarded as having
permanent resident rights until they have resided in the country for the
requisite period of time."1 57 Placing fewer requirements on those who
through the fortuity of birth enjoy citizenship is to create a two-tiered
system of protected interests without adequate justification. 158 As Wood
continues, "[lt is inequitable to place greater demands on immigrants
than on native-born Australians concerning the issue of being a 'good
Australian.' "159
In the early 1980s American courts began to extend to illegal
aliens a greater bundle of rights than they had previously enjoyed. The
rationale for this movement is what has been called "contacts" theory:
constitutional protection rooted not in formal status but, rather, in an
alien's "contacts" with or "ties" to the United States. These contacts,
156 Schuck, supra note 17 at 75.
157 Vood, supra note 41 at 300-01.
158 See also "Immigration Policy," supra note 76 at 1464.
159 Supra note 41 at 301.
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then, create a "constitutionally cognizable liberty interest."16o What is
being argued, and perhaps accepted by some courts, is a conception of
freedom rooted in an individual's engagement in a community, rather
than in a more negative conception of freedom from some action.161
Within the framework of the Canadian constitution, with its
profoundly different sense of freedom and community rooted in the
"inherent dignity of the human person,"162 such an analysis is equally
persuasive. If, as Johnstone writes, "a purpose of the Charter is to
ensure that dignity and self-respect are preserved in interactions with the
state," 63 then, by recognizing community ties as a basis of membership,
the courts must conclude that under certain circumstances non-citizens
do enjoy a right to remain: It is only through a constitutional recognition
of the substantive relationships that individuals form with their
communities that dignity and respect will be ensured. In summary, as
one commentator has concluded, "[t]he participation model, as well as
various other strands of modem doctrine regarding immigration, aims to
replace the category of citizenship with a more acceptable index by
which individual liberty rights are to be determined."164
IV. CONCLUSION: A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO REMAIN
The deportation from Canada of long-term residents is a
deprivation of liberty and security of the person that is not in accordance
with the principles of fundamental justice. This proposition is supported
by the wealth of sources that ought to be considered when interpreting
section 7 of the Charter. The Charter as a whole, jurisprudence on the
European Convention, Canada's international obligations under the
ICCPR, and principles of freedom of movement drawn from the
European Community, all point to a right to remain for long-term
residents. Furthermore, the substantive connections that an individual
forges with his or her community provide a more compelling basis for
constitutional recognition than does formalistic categorization. And
160 "Immigration Policy," supra note 76 at 1325. Particular reference is made to the case of
Landon v. Plescia 103 U.S. 321 (1982), which recognized that a resident alien could not be excluded
at the border when returning after being out of the country.
1 61 ibid. at 1324.
162 See, for example, B.C Motor Vehicles, supra note 46; and R. v. Morgentaler, supra note 84.
1 63 Johnstone, supra note 100 at 22.
1 64
"Immigration Policy," supra note 76 at 1464.
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while the common law is also a valuable source of interpretation, it need
not be determinative.
Many of the principles drawn from the various sources set out
above are presently considered by the iAD when determining whether
equitable relief should be granted to a person ordered deported. (Of
course, long-term illegals not entitled to an appeal do not benefit from
this consideration.) The Immigration Act states that decisions in equity
should be made "having regard to all the circumstances," and this has
been interpreted in Ribic to include considerations of the seriousness of
the offence, the possibility of rehabilitation, the length of time spent in
Canada, the ties to family and community, and, generally, the hardship
that would be caused by deportation.165 I would argue that each of these
criteria is valid and ought to be considered whenever a long-term
resident faces deportation, regardless of their status in Canada. I would
add, however, that equitable considerations under the Immigration Act
provide an inadequate recognition of, and insufficient protection for, the
interests at stake. These interests engage the constitution, and it is only
through constitutional recognition of a right to remain for long-term
residents that adequate protection can be extended.
The recognition of the Ribic criteria under section 7 of the
Charter leaves to the courts the determination of whether deportation in
a particular situation is constitutional. The TAD "can expect no curial
deference with respect to constitutional decisions." 166 Moreover, basing
a right to remain not on equity but on the Charter, expands the scope of
this guarantee. Under the Immigration Act only permanent residents
have a right of appeal on grounds of equity; under the Charter, "every
human being who is physically present in Canada"167 would enjoy this
protection. Constitutional recognition ought to be based upon
substantive considerations and not upon suspect classifications. The
right to remain for long-term residents must be recognized under the
Charter where, after meaningful balancing, the individual's interests
outweigh those of the state. And, finally, the formalistic distinction
between citizens and non-citizens must be rejected where it is found to
be without substance.
1 65 Ribic, supra note 24.
1 66 Cuddy Chicks Ltdc v. Ontario (Labour Relations Board), [1991] 2 S.C.R. 5 at 17.
167 Singh, supra note 14 at 202.
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